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Conventional wisdom about the relationship between income distribution and economic development
has been subjected to dramatic transformations in the past century. While classical economists advanced
the hypothesis that inequality is beneficial for growth, the neoclassical paradigm dismissed the classical
hypothesis and suggested that income distribution has limited role in the growth process.  A metamorphosis
in these perspectives has taken place in the past two decades. Theory and subsequent empirical evidence
have demonstrated that income distribution has a significant impact on human capital formation and
the development process.  In early stages of industrialization, as physical capital accumulation was
a prime engine of growth, inequality enhanced the process of development by channeling resources
towards individuals whose marginal propensity to save is higher. In later stages of development, however,
as human capital has become a main engine of growth, equality, in the presence of credit constraints,
has stimulated human capital formation and growth.  Moreover, unequal distribution of land has been
a hurdle for economic development. While industrialists have had an incentive to support education
policies that foster human capital formation, landowners, whose interests lay in the reduction of the
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Conventional wisdom about the relationship between income distribution and macroeconomic
activity has been subjected to dramatic transformations in the past century. While Classical
economists advanced the hypothesis that inequality is beneﬁcial for economic development, the
Neoclassical paradigm, which had subsequently dominated the ﬁeld of macroeconomics, dismissed
the Classical thesis and promoted the viewpoint that the study of income distribution has no
signiﬁcance for the understanding of macroeconomic activity and the growth process.
A metamorphosis in these perspectives has taken place in the past two decades. Theory
and subsequent empirical evidence have demonstrated that income distribution does, in fact,
have a signiﬁcant impact on the growth process. Moreover, unlike the Classical viewpoint, which
underlined the beneﬁcial eﬀects of inequality for the growth process, the modern theory has
highlighted the potential adverse eﬀects of inequality on the process of development.
1.1 From the Classical to the Modern Perspective
The Classical approach advanced the hypothesis that inequality is beneﬁcial for economic devel-
opment in the post-industrialization period (Kaldor, 1955).1 It suggests that since the marginal
propensity to save increases with wealth, inequality channels resources towards individuals whose
marginal propensity to save is higher, increasing aggregate savings, capital accumulation, and eco-
nomic growth.2 The Classical hypothesis, however, was implicitly dismissed by the representative
agent paradigm that had dominated the ﬁeld of macroeconomics. The inﬂuential Neoclassical
approach rejected the relevance of heterogeneity, and thus the distribution of income, for macro-
economic analysis. It implicitly interpreted the observed relationship between inequality and
economic growth as capturing the eﬀect of the growth process on the distribution of income.3
The Neoclassical viewpoint has been challenged in the past two decades, as both theories
and subsequent empirical evidence have demonstrated that income distribution has a signiﬁcant
1Development economists advanced an additional hypothesis about the relationship between inequality and
economic development that is largely tangential to the understating of this association in the modern, post-
industrialization era. As argued by Rosenstein-Rodan (1943), Lewis (1954), Baldwin (1956), and North (1959),
and formulated by Murphy et al. (1989), in the absence of international demand for domestic industrial goods, a
wide distribution of the income generated from the leading agricultural sector may be critical for industrialization.
2Echoing the insight of the Classical economists, it was established that within a Neoclassical growth model with
a convex saving function, the distribution of income might lead to either an equalitarian or unequal distribution
of income in the long-run (Stiglitz, 1969), where the less egalitarian equilibrium is superior (Bourguignon, 1981).
3This viewpoint can be traced to the hypothesis advanced by Kuznets (1955), according to which, the inverted
U relationship between inequality and economic development that he found reﬂects a causation from the process
of development to the distribution of income.
1impact on the growth process. In contrast to the representative agent approach which domi-
nated the ﬁeld of macroeconomics for several decades, the modern perspective, originated by
Galor and Zeira (1988, 1993), has underlined the role of heterogeneity in the determination of
macroeconomic activity. It has advanced a novel viewpoint that heterogeneity, and thus income
distribution, plays an important role in the determination of aggregate economic activity and
economic growth in the short run as well as in the long run.
Galor and Zeira have demonstrated that in the presence of credit market imperfections in-
come distribution has a long-lasting eﬀect on investment in human capital, aggregate income, and
economic development. Moreover, in contrast to the Classical hypothesis, which underscored the
virtues of inequality for economic growth, their research advanced the hypothesis that inequality
may be detrimental for human capital formation and economic development.
The modern perspective about the relationship between inequality and economic devel-
opment has subsequently emerged, resulting in a voluminous body of research that have high-
lighted the adverse eﬀect of inequality on the process of development.4 The initial research has
been widely classiﬁed into two broad approaches for the examination of the relationship be-
tween inequality and growth: the credit market imperfection approach and the political economy
approach.5
1.2 The Credit Market Imperfections Channel
The credit market imperfection approach for the study of income distribution and economic
growth has explored the implications and the robustness of the eﬀect of inequality on the process
of development in the presence of credit market imperfections.
Galor and Zeira have demonstrated that in the presence of credit market imperfections
and ﬁxed costs associated with investment in education, occupational choices (and thus the
eﬃcient segmentation of the labor force between skilled and unskilled workers) are aﬀected by
the distribution of income. In particular, if the interest rate for borrowers is higher than that
for lenders, inequality may result in an under-investment in human capital.6 Inequality may
4This chapter, written from a macro-growth perspective, focuses on the literature that explores the eﬀect of
inequality on the development process, rather than on the forces that prevent (Loury, 1981) or generate persistent
inequality within an economy (Benabou, 1996; Durlauf, 1996a; Fernández and Rogerson, 1996; Mookherjee and
Ray, 2003) or across economies (Galor and Mountford, 2008; Galor, 2010).
5An additional line of research that has generated less attention examined the eﬀect of inequality on aggre-
gate demand, innovations, and growth, in the presence of non-homothetic preferences (Chou and Talmain, 1996;
Matsuyama, 2000; Foellmi and Zweimuller, 2006).
6Although the provision of public education mitigates the eﬀect of inequality on human capital formation, the
2therefore adversely aﬀect macroeconomic activity and economic development in the short-run,
and due to intergenerational transfers and their eﬀect on the persistence of inequality, it may
generate a detrimental eﬀect on economic development in the long-run as well.7
The credit market imperfection approach for the study of the eﬀects of income distri-
bution on economic growth, which has subsequently emerged, maintained the two fundamental
assumptions of the Galor—Zeira model (i.e., credit market imperfections and ﬁxed costs associated
with individual-speciﬁc investment projects), establishing the robustness of the main hypothesis.8
Notably, Banerjee and Newman (1993) examine the eﬀect of inequality on a diﬀerent type of oc-
cupational choices — the choice between becoming an entrepreneur or a worker. They demonstrate
that if credit markets are imperfect and ﬁxed costs are associated with entrepreneurial activi-
ties, inequality may result in an under-investment in entrepreneurial activity and may therefore
be harmful for economic development.9 Furthermore, they establish that as long as wages are
endogenous, the main hypothesis of the credit market imperfection approach is robust to the in-
troduction of random shocks to the outcome of investment (in human capital or entrepreneurial
activities).10
The interplay between income inequality and equality of opportunities that has been un-
derlined by Galor and Zeira led to an additional strand of research within the credit market
imperfection approach. This research examines the eﬀect of inequality on the degree of in-
tergenerational mobility and thus the eﬃciency in the allocation of talents across occupations
(Fershtman et al., 1996; Owen and Weil, 1998; Maoz and Moav, 1999; Checchi et al., 1999;
adverse eﬀect is still maintained due to the diﬀerential eﬀect of inequality on: (i) the importance of forgone earnings
in education decisions, (ii) the allocation of parental inputs in the production of the children’s human capital (Galor
and Tsiddon, 1997b), (iii) the ability of parents to optimally select the schooling environment for their children
(Benabou, 1996; Durlauf, 1996a; Fernández and Rogerson, 1996), and (iv) assortative mating (Fernández and
Rogerson, 2001;Fernandez et al., 2005). Moreover, it should be noted that while the positive eﬀect of wage
inequality on the incentive to invest in human capital may counterbalance the adverse eﬀect of limited parental
resources on investment in human capital in the lower tail of the income distribution, other forms of inequality
(e.g., wealth inequality and inequality in the distribution of income between capital, land and labor) do not aﬀect
the incentive to invest in human capital.
7In contrast, in suﬃciently poor economies, where the ﬁxed cost of education is high in comparison to the
level of income per capita, inequality may permit at least members of the upper tail of the income distribution to
undertake investment in human capital. Hence, higher inequality would be expected to be associated with higher
investment in education.
8The Galor—Zeira setup was further exploited by Quah (1996) to shed light on the emergence of convergence
clubs (and thus persistent inequality) in the world economy, in the presence of imperfect capital mobility across
economies.
9Aghion and Bolton (1997) further demonstrate that redistribution improves the eﬃciency of the economy,
because it enhances equality of opportunity and the trickle-down process from the rich to the poor.
10See also Piketty (1997).
3Hassler et al., 2007).11
Furthermore, the interaction between income inequality and credit market imperfections
was placed at the center of an important literature that examines the relationship between segre-
gation and persistent inequality.12 These studies have demonstrated that in the presence of credit
market imperfections, inequality enhances segregation across communities and thus, in the light
of local externalities in the production of human capital, it may generate persistent education
and income gaps (Benabou, 1996; Durlauf, 1996a, 1996b; Fernández and Rogerson, 1996).13
1.3 The Political Economy Channel
The political economy approach for the study of the relationship between inequality and economic
growth further advanced the viewpoint that inequality is harmful for economic development.
Earlier studies have argued that inequality generates a pressure to adopt redistributive policies,
and the distortions associated with these policies adversely aﬀect investment in physical and
human capital and thus the growth process.
These studies have suggested that in societies that are characterized by inequality, distrib-
utional conﬂicts may bias political decisions in favor of appropriation. Hence, since the incentives
for productive accumulation of physical capital, human capital, and knowledge hinge on the abil-
ity of individuals to privately appropriate the return on their investment, inequality may diminish
investment and economic growth. In particular, using the median voter paradigm, it was hypoth-
esized that in a more equitable society, taxation on physical capital (Alesina and Rodrik, 1994)
and human capital (Persson and Tabellini, 1994) is lower, limiting the degree of distortions in
investment decisions, and promoting economic growth.
In light of the inconsistency of this mechanism with empirical evidence (Perotti, 1996),
subsequent theories advanced the thesis that inequality may in fact generate an incentive for
better-endowed agents to lobby against redistribution, preventing eﬃcient redistribution policies
from being implemented (Saint-Paul and Verdier, 1996; Benabou, 2000, 2002). Moreover, others
have examined the long-run eﬀects of inequality in the ownership of factors of production on
11The adverse eﬀect of inequality on occupational choices and intergenerational mobility is robust to the removal
of credit market imperfections as long as parental human capital and social background are introduced into the
analysis (Galor and Tsiddon, 1997a, 1997b;Hassler and Mora, 2000; Zilcha, 2003; Mejía and St-Pierre, 2008; Brezis
and Temin, 2008).
12In an inﬂuential study, Loury (1981), have underlined the lack of persistence of inequality, despite credit market
imperfections.
13Eicher et al. (2009) examines the interaction between inequality, corruption and education.
4the incentive for better-endowed agents to block the implementation of institutional changes
and policies that promote human capital formation and thus economic growth (Engerman and
Sokoloﬀ, 2000; Galor et al., 2009).
2 The Benchmark Model
The basic framework of analysis for the eﬀect on inequality on income per capita is the Galor-Zeira
model. The model demonstrates that under plausible conditions (i.e., credit market imperfections
and ﬁxed costs in the acquisition of human capital), income distribution has a long lasting eﬀect
on investment in human capital, aggregate income, and the development process.14 In particular,
if the interest rate for borrowers is higher than that for lenders, as is universally the case, the
distribution of income aﬀects occupational choices (and thus the eﬃcient segmentation of the
labor force between skilled and unskilled workers), and it may result in an under-investment in
human capital. Inequality may therefore adversely aﬀect macroeconomic activity and economic
development in the short-run, and due to intergenerational transfers and their eﬀect on the
persistence of inequality, it may adversely aﬀect economic development in the long-run as well.
Consider a small open overlapping-generations economy in which economic activity extends
over inﬁnite discrete time. In every period the economy produces a single homogeneous good that
can be used for consumption and investment. The good is produced in two sectors using capital,
skilled labor and unskilled labor in the production process. The stock of physical capital in
every period is formed by aggregate domestic saving in the preceding period, net of international
lending, whereas the segmentation of the labor force between skilled and unskilled labor in every
period is the outcome of individuals’ education decisions in an environment characterized by
credit market imperfections.
2.1 Production of Final Output
Production occurs within a period. The output produced in the domestic economy at time  
is the sum of the output produced in the skilled labor-intensive sector,  
  and the unskilled
labor-intensive sector,  
  Namely,
 =  
 +  
  (1)
14The main hypothesis of the credit market imperfection approach is robust, however, to the removal of the
assumption of a ﬁxed cost of education or investment projects, as long as savings are an increasing function of
wealth (Moav, 2002; Galor and Moav, 2004).
5The output produced in the skilled labor-intensive sector is governed by a neoclassical
constant-returns-to-scale production technology,
 
 = ( 
) ≡ 
();  ≡ 
 (2)
where  and 
 are the quantities of physical capital and skilled labor employed in production
at time  Capital depreciates fully within a period.15 The intensive production function, () is
monotonically increasing, strictly concave in  and satisﬁes the neoclassical boundary conditions
that assure the existence of an interior level of  that maximizes proﬁt.
The output produced in the unskilled-intensive sector is governed by a linear production




where 0 is the marginal productivity of unskilled labor in the production of ﬁnal output.
Producers operate in a perfectly competitive environment. Given the interest rate,  and
the wage rate of skilled labor, 
 producers in the skilled labor-intensive sector in period  choose
the level of employment of capital,  and the skilled labor, 
 so as to maximize proﬁts. That
is,
{ 
} =a r gm a x [ 
() − 

 − ] (4)
The producers’ inverse demand for factors of production is therefore
 = 0() ≡ ();

 = () − 0() ≡ ()
(5)
Similarly producers in the unskilled labor-intensive sector demand labor as long as the
wage of an unskilled laborer does not exceed its productivity,  The demand for unskilled labor
in this sector in period  is therefore perfectly elastic at the wage level 
 = 
2.2 Factor Prices
Suppose that capital is perfectly mobile internationally and the world interest rate is constant
over time at level 0 Producers can borrow and individuals can lend unlimited funds at this
rate at the world market.
15Imperfect capital depreciation has no eﬀect on the qualitative results.
6The interest rate in the domestic economy in period ,  is therefore equal to the constant
world interest rate  i.e.,
 =  (6)
In particular, if the entire aggregate saving in the domestic economy would have been channeled
towards the domestic production and would have generated a marginal productivity of capital
that exceeds the world interest rate, international capital would ﬂow into the domestic economy
till the marginal productivity of capital in the domestic economy would be equal to the world
interest rate. However, if the entire aggregate saving in the domestic economy would have been
channeled towards the domestic production and would have generated a marginal productivity
of capital that would be lower than the world interest rate, domestic savings would ﬂow into
the world economy until the marginal productivity of capital in the domestic economy would be
equal to the world interest rate.
International capital mobility implies therefore that the ratio of capital to skilled-labor
employed in production,  is constant over time. In particular, as follows from (5) and (6),
 = 0−1() ≡  (7)
and thus the wage of an skilled worker,

 = () ≡  (8)
is constant over time at a level 
Furthermore, the perfectly elastic demand for unskilled labor in the unskilled-intensive
sector implies that as long as unskilled labor is present in the economy,

 =  ≡  (9)
2.3 Individuals
I ne v e r yp e r i o dag e n e r a t i o nw h i c hc o n s i s t so facontinuum of individuals of measure one is born.
Each individual has a single parent and a single child. Individuals, within as well as across
generations, are identical in their preferences and innate abilities. They may diﬀer, however, in
their family wealth and thus, due to imperfect capital markets, in their investment in human
capital.16
16The introduction of population growth does not aﬀect the qualitative results.
7Individuals live for two periods. In the ﬁrst period of life (childhood) an individual can
either join the labor force as an unskilled worker or devote time to a costly acquisition of human
capital. Their consumption in this period is an integral part of parental consumption.
Individuals receive a parental transfer (bequest) towards the end of the period. Those who
choose to become skilled workers, channel the parental transfer towards the cost of education. If
parental transfer is insuﬃcient to cover the entire cost of education they can access an imperfect
capital market and borrow the remaining part at the borrowers’ interest rate. If parental transfer
exceeds the cost of education, the excess is saved for the second period of life at the lender interest
rate. In contrast, individuals who choose to join the labor market directly as unskilled workers
save their parental transfer and their wage income for adulthood.
In the second period of their lives (adulthood), individuals who did not acquire education
in the ﬁrst period of life continue to work as unskilled workers, whereas those who acquired
education join the labor force as skilled workers. All individuals allocate their wage income and
the returns on their savings between family consumption and capital transfers to their children.
2.3.1 Preferences and Budget Constraint
Preferences of an individual who is born in period  (a member of generation )a r ed e ﬁned over
household consumption in adulthood, +1 and over the intergenerational transfer (bequest) to
the oﬀspring, +1 The preferences are represented by a log-linear utility function,
 = log+1 +( 1− )log+1 (10)
where  ∈ (01)17
The budget constraint of a member of generation  during adulthood is therefore
+1 + +1 ≤ +1 (11)
where the level of wealth of individual  i nt h es e c o n dp e r i o do fl i f e ,+1 reﬂects the parental
transfer and occupational decisions made in the ﬁrst period of life. It consists of the individual’s
wage income in the second period of life net of loan repayments, capital income on savings, and
wealth carried from the ﬁrst period of life.
17This utility function reﬂects the joy of giving. As established in the robustness section, the qualitative analysis
will not be aﬀected if preferences are deﬁned over the utility of the oﬀspring.
82.3.2 Optimization
In the second period life (adulthood), individuals allocate their second period wealth, +1
between consumption, +1,a n db e q u e s t ,+1 so as to maximize their utility function subject to
their second period budget constraint:
{+1 +1} =a r gm a x [ ln+1 +( 1− )ln+1]
subject to: +1 + +1 ≤ +1
(12)
Hence, a ﬁxed fraction,  of their second period wealth, +1 is devoted to consumption
and the remaining fraction, (1 − ) is devoted to bequest, i.e.,
+1 = +1;
+1 =( 1− )+1
(13)
Moreover, the indirect utility function of members of generation   (i.e., the level of
utility generated by the optimal choices of +1 and +1) is monotonically increasing in their
second period wealth, +1 i.e.,
 =[ ln +( 1− )ln(1− )] + ln+1 (14)
Thus, an occupational choice in the ﬁrst period of life that maximizes the individual’s
second period wealth, +1 maximizes the individual’s utility.
2.4 Fundamental Assumptions
The eﬀect of the distribution of income on occupational choices and macroeconomic activity in
the short-run is generated by the presence of credit market imperfections, whereas the long-run
eﬀects of income distribution on macroeconomic activity is triggered by a ﬁxed cost associated
with acquisition of human capital.
Suppose that credit markets are imperfect. While individuals can lend unlimited funds at
the world interest rate,  the interest rate for individuals who wish to borrow in order to invest
in human capital is higher than  reﬂecting monitoring cost designed to avoid default and the
inability of human capital to serve as a tangible collateral for the loan.18 Hence
  (2.A1)
18Due to reputation and the cost of mobility, ﬁrms are assumed to be unable to evade debt payment and thus
they can borrow at the world interest rate  This simplifying assumption has no bearing on the qualitative results.
9where  is the interest rate paid to lenders and  is the interest rate on loans that are designed
to ﬁnance investment in human capital.
Suppose further that the acquisition of education is associated with a ﬁxed cost,  =
19 This ﬁxed cost may reﬂects the indivisibility of human capital formation in general and of
academic degrees in particular.20 The ﬁxed cost of education can be viewed as a weighted average
of the payments to teachers, administrators, and maintenance workers in the school system (i.e.,
a weighted average of the wages of skilled and unskilled workers). In particular,
 =  +( 1− ) ≡ 0 (2.A2)
for some  ∈ [01]
2.5 Occupational Choice
In the ﬁrst period of life individuals make an occupational choice. They can either acquire
education and work in adulthood as skilled workers, or join the labor force directly as unskilled
worker and remain unskilled in adulthood.
2.5.1 Income of an Unskilled Worker
An individual  who decides to join the labor force directly as an unskilled worker earns in the
ﬁrst period of life the wage of an unskilled worker,  In addition, in the end of the ﬁrst period,
the individual receives a bequest of . Since consumption in childhood is an intrinsic part of
the household consumption, these resources are saved for adulthood. In the second period of life
(adulthood) the individual’s wealth consists of ﬁrst period saving,  + capital income on the
saving, ( + ) in addition to their second period wage income,  Hence the second period
wealth, 
+1 of an unskilled member of generation  who receive an inheritance,  is

+1 = (2 + )+( 1+) ≡ () (15)
2.5.2 Income of a Skilled Worker
An individual  who decides to acquire education and to join the labor force in the second period
of life as a skilled worker earns in the second period of life the wage of a skilled worker,  The
19As underlined in section 2.9, the main hypothesis is robust, however, to the removal of the assumption of a
ﬁxed cost of education or investment projects, as long as savings are an increasing function of wealth.
20This indivisibility is reﬂected in a discrete jump in the return to high school graduates versus high school
dropouts, or in the return to college graduates versus college dropouts.
10wealth of the individual in period  +1  
+1 depends on whether parental transfers in the ﬁrst
period of life,  are suﬃcient to cover the cost of education,  If  the individual borrows
in the ﬁrst period of life the additional required funds, ( − ), and repays the loan along with
the interest rate for borrowers,  from the wage income in the second period of life. If, however,
 the individual ﬁnances the entire cost of education using the parental transfer, saving the
excess funds, ( −) In the second period of life the individual wealth consists of wage income,
 saving,  −  and capital income ( − )
Hence the second period wealth, 
+1 of a skilled member of generation  who receive an
inheritance,  is





 − ( − )(1 + )   ≤ 








 − (1 + ) +( 1+)   ≤ 
 − (1 + ) +( 1+)   ≥ 
(17)
2.5.3 Parental Transfers and Occupational Choices
A member of generation  who receive an inheritance,  acquires education if

+1 = ()  
+1 = () (18)
Hence, the desirability of investment in human capital for a member of generation  depends on
the individual’s level of inheritance, 
Since individuals are identical in their abilities and the only ex-ante source of heterogeneity
among individuals is parental income, the presence of skilled and unskilled workers in society in
every time period would require an additional assumptions. In particular, if investment in human
capital is proﬁtable even for individuals who ought to ﬁnance the entire cost of education via
borrowing, then counter-factually, all individuals would invest in human capital. Furthermore,
if investment in human capital is not proﬁtable even for those who can ﬁnance the entire cost
of education from parental transfer, then counter-factually, no individual will invest in human
capital.
11Thus, suppose that investment in human capital is beneﬁcial for individuals who can ﬁnance
the entire cost of education without borrowing, i.e.,
 − (1 + ) (2 + ) (2.A3)
and suppose it is detrimental for individuals who must ﬁnance the entire cost of education via
borrowing, i.e.,21
 − (1 + )0 (2.A4)
As follows from (15) and (17), and as depicted in Figure 1, (0)  0  (0) (Assumption




+1 = () (19)
where
 ≡
(2 + ) − [ − (1 + )]
 − 
 0 (20)
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Figure 1. The Threshold Level of Bequest,  above which Investment
in Human Capital is Proﬁtable
21At this stage of the analysis, it is suﬃcient to assume that 
 −(1+)
(2+) However as will become
apparent, the existence of multiple steady-state equilibria in the dynamics of bequests necessitates a stronger
assumption, i.e., 
 − (1 + )0
12Hence, members of generation  choose to acquire education if they receive parental transfer, 
that exceeds that threshold level  Namely,

+1 = ()  
+1 = () if and only if    (21)
Thus, income distribution aﬀects occupational choices in the short-run. Let the distribution
of inheritance at time  be () i.e.,
Z ∞
0
() =  ≡ 1 (22)
where  ≡ 1 is the size of the adult generation in period  It follows that the fraction of the
adult generation in period  +1that choose to become unskilled workers, 
+1 and the fraction











Hence, the distribution of income in period  directly determines the segmentation of the adult
generation in periods  +1between skilled and unskilled workers, aﬀecting the level of income
per capita in this period.22
2.6 Bequest Dynamics
The long-run eﬀects of the distribution of income on the process of development and macroeco-
nomic activities is determined by the interaction between occupational choices and the evolution
of bequest.
As follows from the solution to the individual’s optimization (13), members of generation
 transfer a fraction (1 − ) of their wealth, +1 to their oﬀspring. That is







+1 = () if  ≤ 

+1 = () if   
(25)
Hence, the inheritance received by members of generation  determines their occupational choices,
wealth, and the level of bequest to their oﬀspring.
22In addition, it aﬀects that fraction of the younger generation that joins the labor force as unskilled workers at
time 
13The evolution of bequest is determined by the sequence {}∞
=0 such that, as follows from
the deﬁnition of () and () given by (15) and (17),
+1 = () ≡
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
(1 − )[(2 + )+( 1+)] if 0 ≤  ≤ 
(1 − )[ − (1 + ) +( 1+)] if  ≤  ≤ 
(1 − )[ − (1 + ) +( 1+)] if  ≤ 
(26)
Hence the dynamical system is piecewise linear. In particular, if
(1 − )(1 + )  1





⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
(1 − )(1 + )  1 if 0 ≤  
(1 − )(1 + )  1 if   
(1 − )(1 + )  1 if  
(27)
The dynamical system is characterized by multiple locally stable steady-state equilibria,
as depicted in Figure 2, under additional restrictions on the parameters of the model.23
23Since (0) = (1 − )
(2 + )  0 and since 
0()  1 for  ≥  multiplicity of locally stable steady-state
equilibria is guaranteed if () and ()  Namely, if 
(2 + )[(1 − )(1 + ) − 1]  [(1 + ) − 
][1 −
(1 − )(1 + )] and (1 − )
  
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Figure 2. Bequest Dynamics:
Multiple Steady-State Equilibria in Intergenerational Transfers
Dynasties whose initial levels of intergenerational transfers are below  converge in the
long-run to the lower steady-state equilibrium level, ¯  w h e r et h el e v e lo fp a r e n t a lt r a n s f e r sa r e
insuﬃcient to permit investment in human capital by oﬀspring. In contrast, dynasties whose
initial level of intergenerational transfers is above  permit investment in human capital by
oﬀspring and the levels of intergenerational transfer among members of those dynasties converge









1−(1−)(1+) if   ;
¯  ≡
(1−)[−(1+)]
1−(1−)(1+) if   
(28)
The level of bequest that determines the segmentation of society between educated and
uneducated individuals as well as the segmentation of the labor force in the long-run is
 ≡
(1 − )[(1 + ) − ]
(1 − )(1 + ) − 1
 (29)
as can be derived from (26), where 0 as follows from Assumptions 2.A4 and 2.A5.
15The threshold level of bequest,  above which investment in human capital is beneﬁcial for
members of the dynasty in the long-run is lower if (a) the cost of education,  is lower, (b) the
wage of a skilled worker,  and thus the incentive to become a skilled worker is higher, (c) the
interest rate for borrowers,  is lower, or (d) the propensity of individuals to bequeath, (1 − )
is higher.24
2.7 Distribution, Skill Composition and Income
2.7.1 Income Distribution and the Composition of Skills
Given the distribution of inheritance at time , () the critical level of bequest,  deter-
mines the long-run composition of the labor force. As depicted in Figure 3, the fraction of each








 () ≡ ¯ 
(30)
where
¯   0 (31)
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Figure 3. Income Distribution and Skill Composition.
24Note that (1 − )  0 if Assumption 2.A4 is satisﬁed.
16Thus, the distribution of income determines not only the composition of skills and macro-
economic activities in the short-run, but via its eﬀect on future intergenerational transfers, it
also aﬀects the composition of skills and macroeconomic activity in the long-run. Moreover,
inequality persists over time and the distribution of income tends towards bimodality.
2.7.2 Persistence of Inequality
The initial distribution of income aﬀects occupational choices, and the distribution of income
in the short-run. However, as demonstrated in Figure 4, the interaction between occupational
choices and intergenerational transfers aﬀects occupation choices and the distribution of income
in the long-run as well.
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Figure 4. Persistence of Inequality
While heterogeneity of ability may permit upward mobility of high ability, low income
individuals and downward mobility of low ability, high income inequality, income inequality nev-
ertheless operates towards the segmentation of society into two clubs; a club of poor, uneducated
individuals and a club of rich, educated individuals. This outcome, which may raise important
social and economic concerns, has signiﬁcant direct eﬀects on aggregate economic activity and
economic growth.
172.7.3 Skill Composition and Income Per Capita
Income distribution aﬀects the composition of skills in the labor force, and thus has an impact
on the level of income per capita in the short-run as well as the long-run.
In the long-run the labor force consists of ¯  young unskilled workers, ¯  adult unskilled
workers, and ¯  skilled workers. The steady-state level of income in the economy is given therefore
by (i) the wage income of unskilled individuals in the ﬁrst period of life, (ii) wage and capital
income of unskilled individuals in the second period of life, and (iii) wage and capital income of
skilled individuals in the second period of life.
The steady-state level of income of a skilled individual in the second period of life, 
2
consists of wage income,  and capital income, (¯  −),r e ﬂecting the return on saving in the
ﬁrst period of life. Hence,25

2 =  +( ¯  − ) (32)
The steady-state level of income of an unskilled individual in the second period of life, 
2 consists
of a wage income,  and capital income, (¯  + ),r e ﬂecting the return on the saving, i.e.,

2 =  +( ¯  + ) (33)
Finally, the income of an unskilled individual in the ﬁrst period of life, 
1 consists only of the
wage income,  :26

1 =  (34)
The aggregate level of income in the domestic economy in the steady-state, ¯ is therefore
¯  = 
2¯  + 
2¯  + 
1¯  (35)
Using the fact that ¯  + ¯  =1  it follows that
¯  =[ (2 + )+¯ ](1 − ¯ )+[  + (¯  − )]¯ 
= (2 + )+¯  +[ (  − ) − (2 + )+(¯  −¯ )]¯ 
(36)
The steady-state level of income per capita is ¯  = ¯  2 noting that the size of the population is
equal to 2 in every time period.
25In the steady-state the level of intergenerational transfer among skilled dynasties exceeds the cost of education,
 Hence skilled individuals have a positive level of saving on which they receive the interest rate for lenders, 
26Note that individuals in the ﬁrst period of their lives do not have capital income. They receive an inheritance
that constitutes their wealth in the ﬁr s tp e r i o d ,b u tt h i si sn o te a r n e di n c o m ea n di st h u sn o tr e l e v a n tf o rt h e
calculation of an economy’s aggregate income.
18An increase in the fraction of skilled workers increases therefore income per capita. Namely,
¯ 
¯  =[ (  − ) − (2 + )+(¯  −¯ )]2  0 (37)
noting that ¯   ¯  (as follows from (28)) and (−)−(2+)  0 (as a result of Assumption
2.A3).
Moreover, a society characterized by a lower threshold of bequest above which individuals
invest in human capital (i.e., a lower level of ) have a higher level of income per capita in the









Thus the initial distribution of income aﬀects income per capita in the short-run as well as
in long-run. If the distribution of income across members of society is characterized by a lower
fraction of individuals that can not invest in human capital then income per capita increases in
the long-run.
For a given distribution of income, income per capita in the long-run is higher the lower
is the threshold level of bequest,  above which investment in human capital is beneﬁcial for
members of the dynasty in the long-run. Namely, income per capita in the long-run is higher if
(a) the cost of education,  is lower, (b) the wage of a skilled worker,  and thus the incentive
to become a skilled worker is higher, (c) the interest rate for borrowers,  is lower, or (d) the
propensity of individuals to bequeath, (1 − ) is higher.
2.8 Inequality and Economic Development
Income distribution aﬀects the growth process and the level of income per capita in the long-run.
Inequality in the distribution of income may have an adverse eﬀect on the growth process in a
non-poor economy, whereas inequality may have a beneﬁcial eﬀect on the growth process in poor
economies.
Consider an economy in period  w h e r ei n c o m ep e rc a p i t ai ss u ﬃciently large relative to
the cost of education. In particular, suppose that the average level of bequest in period  ˆ 
exceeds the critical level,  above which investment in human capital is beneﬁcial for members
of the dynasty in the long-run, i.e.,




   (39)
19As is illustrated in Figure 5, for a given average level of bequest in period  ˆ  an increase
in inequality (for a wide class of measures of inequality) will be associated with an increase in
the number of individuals below the critical level  Thus, inequality in non-poor economies is
likely to reduce investment in human capital and may thus decrease the long-run level of income
per capita.
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Figure 5. The Adverse Eﬀect of Inequality on the Process of Development:
AN o n - P o o rE c o n o m y
Consider an economy in period  where income per capita is suﬃciently low relative to the
cost of education. In particular suppose that the average level of bequest in period  ˆ  is lower
than the critical level,  above which investment in human capital is beneﬁcial for members of
the dynasty in the long-run, i.e.,




   (40)
As is illustrated in Figure 6, for a given average level of bequest in period  ˆ  an increase
in inequality (for a wide class of measures of inequality) will be associated with an increase in the
number of individuals above the critical level  Thus, inequality in poor economies may induce
investment in human capital and may thus increase the long-run level of income per capita.
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Figure 6. The Positive Eﬀect of Inequality on the Process of Development:
AP o o rE c o n o m y
Thus the model generates the following testable predictions.
Proposition 1 Among economies that are identical in their structural characteristics (i.e., pro-
duction technologies, preferences, the cost of education, and the degree of credit market imperfec-
tions) and therefore in the threshold level of bequest above which investment in human capital is
beneﬁcial,
a. Inequality in the distribution of income will be associated with higher income per capita
across poor economies.
b. Inequality in the distribution of income will be associated with lower income per capita
across non-poor economies.
2.9 Robustness
2.9.1 Labor-Augmenting Technological Progress
Suppose that the economy experiences an exogenous labor-augmenting technological progress
that transforms the labor force and increases the productivity of workers in both the skilled
labor-intensive and the unskilled labor-intensive sector.
21The output produced in the skilled labor-intensive sector in period  is
 
 = ( 
) ≡ 
();  ≡ 
 (41)
where  is the level of technology in period  and 
 is the number of eﬃciency units of
skilled labor employed in production at time  Similarly, the output produced at the unskilled




Technology evolves over time at a constant exogenous rate 
+1 =( 1+) (43)
where 0 is the rate of labor-augmenting technological progress, and the level of technology
at time 0, 0 is exogenously given.
As follows from the producer’s proﬁt maximization and the presence of perfect international
capital mobility,

 = [() − 0()] ≡ 

 =  ≡ 
 = 
(44)
Suppose further that the acquisition of education is associated with a ﬁxed cost, 
  that
reﬂects the indivisibility of human capital formation in general and of academic degrees in par-
ticular. The ﬁxed cost of education can be viewed as a weighted average of the payments to
teachers, administrators, and maintenance workers in the school system (i.e., a weighted average
of the wages skilled and unskilled workers):

 =  +( 1− ) ≡  for some  ∈ [01] (45)
Hence, the second period wealth, 
+1 of an unskilled member of generation  who receive
an inheritance,  is

+1 = (2 +  + )+( 1+) ≡ ( ) (46)
whereas the second period wealth, 
+1 of a skilled member of generation  who received an
inheritance,  is





+1 − ( − )(1 + )   ≤ 








[(1 + ) − (1 + )]+( 1+)   ≤ 
[(1 + ) − (1 + )]+( 1+)   ≥ 
(48)
Modifying Assumptions 2.A3 and 2.A4 and assuming that
(1 + ) − (1 + )0




it follows from (46) and (48), that there exists a level of bequest,  such that

+1 = ()=
+1 = () (50)
where
 =







(2 + ) − [ − (1 + )] − ( − )
( − )
≡ ˆ 0 (52)
The evolution of bequest is given therefore by
+1 =
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
(1 − ){(2 +  + )+( 1+)} ∈ [0]
(1 − ){[
(1 + ) − (1 + )]+( 1+)} ∈ [ ]
(1 − ){[
(1 + ) − (1 + )]+( 1+)} ∈ [∞)
(53)
Let ˆ +1 ≡ +1+1 then
ˆ +1 ≡ ()=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨


















(1 + ) − (1 + )]+( 1+)ˆ } ˆ ∈ [∞)
(54)
Hence as long as
(1 − )(1 + )  (1 + );
(1 − )(1 + )  (1 + )
(55)
23( ˆ )  ˆ  and ()  the dynamical system is characterized by multiple steady states, where
the unstable equilibrium is
ˆ  =
(1 − )[(1 + ) − (1 + )]
[(1 − )(1 + ) − (1 + )]
 0 (56)
Thus, the qualitative analysis is unaﬀected by labor-augmenting technological progress.
Moreover, if technological progress is a function of the skilled composition of the labor force,
inequality would have an eﬀect on the growth rate of the economy in the steady-state.
2.9.2 Interactions Across Dynasties
The basic Galor—Zeira model establishes the potential adverse eﬀect of inequality on economic
growth in an economy in which wages, for simplicity, are unaﬀected by the composition of the
labor force. The structure of the basic model is designed to assure that factor prices are constant
over time, permitting a simple characterization of the dynamics of income distribution and its
implication for aggregate economic activities and economic development. However, as established
in the second part of Galor and Zeira (1993), the main hypothesis is robust to the endogeniza-
tion of wages and thus to the incorporation of interdependence in investment decisions across
dynasties.
The robustness of the main insights of the th e o r yi na ne n v i r o n m e n tw h e r ef a c t o rp r i c e s
are endogenously determined and investment decisions across dynasties are interdependent is
established in a large number of studies (e.g., Banerjee and Newman, 1993; Galor and Moav,
2004).
2.9.3 Random Shocks
The persistent eﬀect of inequality is immune to shocks to the outcome of investment in human
capital, as long as wages are endogenous. Notably, Banerjee and Newman (1993) examine the
eﬀect of inequality on a diﬀerent type of occupational choice (i.e., the choice between becoming an
entrepreneur or a worker, rather than the choice between becoming either a skilled or an unskilled
worker). They demonstrate that if credit markets are imperfect and ﬁxed costs are associated
with entrepreneurial activities, inequality may result in an under-investment in entrepreneurial
activity and may therefore be harmful for economic development. Their study establishes that as
long as wages are endogenous, the main hypothesis of the credit market imperfection approach as
24a whole is robust to the introduction of random shocks to the outcome of investment (in human
capital or entrepreneurial activities).
2.9.4 Concave Production of Human Capital and Alternative Utility Functions
The qualitative impact of income distribution is unaﬀected by the incorporation of a divisible,
concave production function of human capital, as long as the saving rate is an increasing function
of income (Moav, 2002; Galor and Moav, 2004).
Moreover, as shown in earlier versions of the Galor-Zeira model, the results are robust to
alternative forms of intergenerational altruism in which the utility function is deﬁned over the
utility of the oﬀspring rather than the level of intergenerational transfer to the oﬀspring.
3A U n i ﬁed Theory of Inequality and Growth
The modern perspective on the relationship between inequality and economic development has
been initially segmented. It lacked a uniﬁed hypothesis regarding the relationship between in-
equality and the growth process, particularly in light of the (seemingly) contrasting predictions
generated by the classical approach and the modern approach. The development of a uniﬁed
theory of inequality and growth that captures that changing role of inequality in the process
of development has provided a needed intertemporal reconciliation between the Classical view-
point and the modern perspective, while permitting the dominating theories within the modern
perspective to be placed within a broader framework.
The theory advanced by Galor and Moav (2004) suggests that the replacement of physical
capital accumulation by human capital accumulation as the prime engine of economic growth
has changed the qualitative impact of inequality on the process of development. In early stages
of industrialization, as physical capital accumulation was a prime source of economic growth, in-
equality enhanced the process of development by channeling resources towards individuals whose
marginal propensity to save is higher. In later stages of development, however, as physical capital
accumulated and the demand for human capital increased, human capital has become the main
engine of economic growth.27 A more equal distribution of income, in the presence of credit
constraints, has stimulated investment in human capital and promoted economic growth.
27The rise in the demand for skilled labor may be viewed as an outcome of: (i) capital—skill complementarity,
(ii) a skill-biased technological change, or (iii) an unbiased technological acceleration, reﬂecting the comparative
advantage of educated individuals in coping with a changing technological environment (Nelson and Phelps, 1966;
Schultz, 1975; Foster and Rosenzweig, 1996).
25The central hypothesis of this uniﬁed approach stems from the recognition that human
capital accumulation and physical capital accumulation are fundamentally asymmetric. In con-
trast to physical capital, human capital is inherently embodied in humans and the existence of
physiological constraints subjects its accumulation at the individual level to diminishing returns.
The aggregate stock of human capital would therefore be larger if its accumulation would be
widely spread among individuals in society, whereas the aggregate productivity of the stock of
physical capital is largely independent of the distribution of its ownership in society. This asym-
metry between the accumulation of human and physical capital suggests therefore that as long
as credit constraints are largely binding, a more equal distribution of income is conducive for
human capital accumulation, whereas, provided that the marginal propensity to save increases
with income, inequality is conducive for physical capital accumulation.
The theory, therefore, provides a reconciliation between conﬂicting viewpoints about the
eﬀect of inequality on economic growth. It suggests that the Classical viewpoint, regarding the
positive eﬀect of inequality on the process of development, reﬂects the state of the world in early
stages of industrialization, when physical capital accumulation is the prime engine of economic
growth. In contrast, the central hypothesis of the credit market imperfection approach, regarding
t h en e g a t i v ee ﬀect of inequality on economic growth, reﬂects later stages of development when
human capital accumulation is the prime engine of economic growth and credit constraints are
largely binding.
In early stages of industrialization physical capital is scarce, the rate of return to human
capital is lower than the rate of return to physical capital and the process of development is fueled
by capital accumulation. The positive eﬀect of inequality on aggregate saving dominates therefore
t h en e g a t i v ee ﬀect on investment in human capital and inequality raises aggregate savings and
capital accumulation and enhances the process of development. In later stages of development, as
physical capital accumulates, the complementarity between capital and skills increases the rate of
return to human capital. Investment in human capital accumulation increases and the accumu-
lation of human capital as well as physical capital fuels the process of development. Since human
capital is embodied in individuals and individuals’ investment in human capital is subjected to
diminishing marginal returns, the aggregate return to investment in human capital is maximized
if investment in human capital is widely spread among individuals in society. Equality alleviates
the adverse eﬀect of credit constraints, and has therefore a positive eﬀect on the aggregate level
26of human capital and economic growth. Moreover, the diﬀerences in the marginal propensities
to save across individuals narrow as wages increase, and the negative eﬀect of equality on ag-
gregate saving subsides. In later stages of development, therefore, as long as credit constraints
are suﬃciently binding, the positive eﬀect of inequality on aggregate saving is dominated by the
negative eﬀect on investment in human capital, and equality stimulates economic growth. As
wages further increase, however, credit constraints become less binding, diﬀerences in the mar-
ginal propensity to save further decline, and the aggregate eﬀect of income distribution on the
growth process becomes less signiﬁcant.28
Although the replacement of physical capital accumulation by human capital accumulation
as a prime engine of economic growth in currently developed economies is instrumental for the
understanding of the role of inequality in the process of development of these advanced economies,
this uniﬁed theory generates an insight about the role of inequality in the growth process of less
developed economies as well. The presence of international capital inﬂows has diminished the role
of inequality in stimulating physical capital accumulation in less developed economies. Moreover,
the adoption of skill-biased technologies by some of these economies has increased the return to
human capital and has strengthened the positive eﬀect of a more equal distribution of income on
human capital formation and economic growth.
The uniﬁed theory of inequality and growth may provide greatly needed theoretical guid-
ance for empirical research in this ﬁeld. In contrast to the credit market imperfection approach,
which suggests that the eﬀect of inequality depends on the country’s level of income (i.e., in-
equality is beneﬁcial for poor economies and harmful for others), the uniﬁed theory of inequality
and growth suggests that the eﬀect of inequality on growth depends on the relative return to
physical and human capital. In economies in which the return to human capital is relatively
lower, inequality is beneﬁcial for economic growth, whereas in economies in which the return to
human capital is relatively higher and credit constraints are largely binding, equality is beneﬁcial
for the development process.
28Inequality may widen once again due to skilled- or ability-biased technological change induced by human capital
accumulation. This line of research was explored theoretically by Galor and Tsiddon (1997b), Acemoglu (1998),
Caselli (1999), Galor and Moav (2000), among others. It is consistent with recent evidence provided by Berman
et al. (1998), Goldin and Katz (1998) and Autor et al. (2008), among others.
274 Non-Financial Hurdles for Human Capital Accumulation
While the process of industrialization raised the importance of human capital in the production
process, reﬂecting its complementarity with physical capital and technology, human capital ac-
cumulation has not beneﬁted all sectors of the economy. Inequality in the ownership of factors
of production has generated an incentive for some better-endowed agents to block the imple-
mentation of institutional changes and policies that promote human capital formation, resulting
in a suboptimal level of investment in human capital from a growth perspective. In particular,
variation in the distribution of ownership over land and other natural resources across coun-
tries has contributed to the observed disparity in human capital formation and to the divergent
development patterns across the globe.
4.1 Concentration of Landownership
The transition from an agricultural to an industrial economy changed the nature of the main
economic conﬂict in society. Unlike the agrarian economy, which was characterized by a con-
ﬂict of interests between the landed aristocracy and the masses, the process of industrialization
has brought about an additional conﬂict between the entrenched landed elite and the emerging
capitalist elite. In light of a lower degree of complementarity between human capital and the
agricultural sector, education has increased the productivity of labor in industrial production
more than in agricultural and primary good production, inducing rural-to-urban migration and
thus a decline in the return to landowners. Thus, while industrialists have had a direct economic
incentive to support education policies that would foster human capital formation (Galor and
Moav, 2006), landowners, whose interests lay in the reduction of the mobility of their labor force,
have favored policies that deprived the masses of education (Galor et al., 2009).29
The adverse eﬀect of the implementation of public education on landowners’ income from
agricultural production has been magniﬁed by the concentration of land ownership. Thus, as
29In accordance with the uniﬁed approach for the study of inequality and economic development, this line of
research suggests that capital accumulation in the process of industrialization gradually intensiﬁed the relative
scarcity of skilled labor and generated an incentive for human capital accumulation. Investment in human capital,
however, has been sub-optimal due to credit market imperfections, and public investment in education has been
therefore growth-enhancing. Due to the complementarity between physical and human capital in production,
the capitalists were among the prime beneﬁciaries of the accumulation of human capital by the masses. They
therefore had the incentive to support the provision of public education that improved their economic well-being
and contributed signiﬁcantly to the demise of the capitalists-workers class structure and to changes in the nature of
inequality in society that were conducive to economic development. Mutually beneﬁcial reforms are also considered
by Lizzeri and Persico (2004) and Doepke and Zilibotti (2005).
28long as landowners aﬀected the political process and thereby the implementation of growth-
enhancing education policies, inequality in the distribution of land ownership has been a hurdle
for human capital accumulation, slowing the process of industrialization and the transition to
modern growth.30
Economies in which land and other natural resources have been more equally distributed
have implemented earlier public education campaigns and have beneﬁted from the emergence of a
skill-intensive industrial sector and a rapid process of development. In contrast, among economies
marked by a more unequal distribution of ownership over land and other natural resources,
resource abundance that was a source of richness in the early stages of development has led in
later stages to under-investment in human capital, an unskilled labor-intensive industrial sector,
and a slower growth process. Thus, variation in the distribution of ownership over land and other
natural resources across countries has contributed to disparity in human capital formation and
the industrial composition of the economy, and thus to divergent development patterns across
the globe.31
An alternative mechanism that underlines the adverse eﬀect of inequality on human capital
formation and economic development has been advanced by Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (2000) and
Acemoglu et al. (2005). They argued and provided evidence that geographical conditions that
led to income inequality brought about oppressive institutions (e.g., restricted access to the
democratic process and to education) designed to maintain the political power of the elite and to
preserve the existing inequality between the elite and the masses.32 Thus, Engerman and Sokoloﬀ
(2000) underlined the role of the sustained conﬂict between the elite and the masses in the delay
in the implementation of growth-enhancing educational policies and thus in the adverse eﬀect
of inequality on the process of development, suggesting the perpetual desirability of extractive
30Interestingly, during the 19th century, the emergence of a broad-based demand for human capital-intensive
services by the landowners in land-rich economies in Latin America (e.g., Argentina) triggered the establish-
ment of an extensive public education system prior to the onset of signiﬁcant manufacturing activities (Galiani
et al., 2008). Thus, lack of concentration of land ownership (that was conducive for a broad-based demand for
human capital-intensive services by the landowners) had a positive eﬀect on human capital formation even prior
to industrialization.
31Rajan (2009) reinforces this thesis, suggesting that rent preservation and its interaction with inequality in
ownership over factor endowment is a recipe for paralysis and poverty.
32Acemoglu et al. (2005) maintain that economic performance across countries have a colonial origin, reﬂecting
the institutional quality that were introduced by European colonialism across the globe. They have argued that
historical reversals in the economic performance of societies have a colonial legacy that reﬂects the imposition
of extractive institutions by European colonizers in aﬄuent regions that beneﬁted from favorable geographical
conditions in the pre-colonial era and the implementation of growth-enhancing institutions in poorer regions.
29institutions for the ruling elite in the absence of changes in the political structure.33
4.2 Social-Political Transitions
Inequality and its association with sociopolitical instability have been identiﬁed as an additional
adverse force in the process of development. In particular, the eﬀect of inequality on social
conﬂict and on political and educational reforms was examined by Alesina and Perotti (1996),
Acemoglu and Robinson (2000), Bourguignon and Verdier (2000), and Gradstein (2007).34 These
studies suggest that reforms and redistribution from the elite to the masses diminish the tendency
for sociopolitical instability and may therefore stimulate investment and economic growth. In
particular, Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) argue that the extension of the franchise during the
nineteenth century can be viewed as a commitment device to ensure future income redistribution
from the elite to the masses.35
In contrast, Galor and Moav (2006) have argued that the transformation in class structure
and inequality can be viewed as a byproduct of a productive cooperation between capitalists
and workers, rather than an outcome of a divisive class struggle. In accordance with the uniﬁed
approach for the study of inequality and economic development, this line of research suggests that
capital accumulation in the process of industrialization gradually intensiﬁed the relative scarcity
of skilled labor and generated an incentive for human capital accumulation. Investment in human
capital, however, has been sub-optimal due to credit market imperfections, and public investment
in education has been therefore growth-enhancing, as per Galor and Zeira (1993). Due to the
complementarity between physical and human capital in production, the capitalists were among
the prime beneﬁciaries of the accumulation of human capital by the masses. They therefore had
the incentive to support the provision of public education that improved their economic well-
being and contributed signiﬁcantly to the demise of the capitalists-workers class structure and to
changes in the nature of inequality in society that were conducive to economic development.
33In contrast, Galor et al. (2009) demonstrate that even if the political structure in the economy remains un-
changed, economic development and a gradual diversiﬁcation of the assets held by the landed aristocracy may
ultimately trigger the implementation of growth-promoting institutions once the stake of the landed aristocracy in
the eﬃcient operation of the industrial sector dominates their overall economic interest.
34See also Bowles and Gintis (1975).
35Mejía and Posada (2007) identify conditions under which a social conﬂict lead to the transition to democracy
and those under which purely economic forces lead to the transition, underlying the relative role of inequality, the
importance of a human capital externalities in production, and the feasibility of redistribution by the masses.
304.3 Gender Inequality
The decline in gender inequality, which was brought about by the rise in the demand for human
capital in the process of development, reinforced the positive association between a more egali-
tarian distribution of income and economic growth. The decline in gender inequality contributed
to the onset of the demographic transition as well as to the rise in female labor force participa-
tion, fostering the growth process as a whole. The decline in the gender wage gap has aﬀected
household fertility decisions, female labor force participation and thus the growth process.
As suggested by Galor and Weil, (1996, 1999) technological progress and capital accu-
mulation complemented mentally intensive tasks and substituted for physically intensive tasks
in industrial production. In light of the comparative physiological advantage of men in physi-
cally intensive tasks and of women in mentally intensive tasks, the demand for women’s labor
input gradually increased, inducing a decline in fertility rates, a signiﬁcant increase in labor force
participation, and a transition from stagnation to growth.36
5 Evidence
5.1 Inequality, Human Capital Formation and Economic Growth
Several attempts have been made to examine the theoretical predictions of the credit market
imperfections approach and the political economy approach about the eﬀect of inequality and
heterogeneity on economic growth. Consistent with the hypothesis advanced by the theories,
early cross-country analyses by Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Persson and Tabellini (1994) and
Perotti (1996) have established a negative association between the level of inequality and economic
growth.
Importantly, Perotti (1996) conducted an examination of the various channels through
w h i c hi n e q u a l i t ym a ya ﬀect economic growth, as proposed by the modern theoretical perspec-
tive. His study provides support for the validity of the human capital formation channel, showing
that inequality is indeed associated with lower level of human capital formation, and lower human
capital formation is associated with lower levels of economic growth.37 Further support for the
36The decline in the overall level of inequality that was associated with the emergence of human capital has
been linked theoretically, empirically and quantitatively to the reduction in fertility and therefore in light of the
quantity-quality trade-oﬀ (e.g., Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1980; Hanushek, 1992) to lower levels of investment in
human capital and income. See, Galor and Zang (1997), Dahan and Tsiddon (1998), Kremer and Chen (2002), de
la Croix and Doepke (2003), and Moav (2005).
37In line with related theoretical arguments that human capital formation and fertility are negatively related and
31main predictions of the education channel, advanced in the context of the credit market imper-
fection approach, has been generated by Deininger and Squire (1998). Utilizing the distribution
of land as a proxy for the distribution of assets, they ﬁnd that initial inequality has a signiﬁcant
adverse eﬀect on education and economic growth. Moreover, consistent with the predictions of
credit market imperfections approach that imperfection ought to have a larger eﬀect on the in-
vestment decisions of individuals with lower income, they ﬁnd that initial inequality primarily
hurts the poor.38
In contrast to the human capital channel, Perotti’s examination of the political economy
channel was not favorable to the theories advanced by Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Persson
and Tabellini (1994). His ﬁndings refute this early hypothesis of the political economy approach,
demonstrating that in contrast to their proposed channel, inequality is in fact associated with
lower levels of taxation, while lower levels of taxation, contrary to the theories, are associated
with lower levels of economic growth.
Later studies have deviated from the desirable examination of the channels through which
inequality may aﬀect growth, and restricted their attention to the reduced form relationship
between inequality and growth. Notably, Forbes (2000) and Barro (2000) examined the eﬀect
of inequality on economic growth in a panel of countries. They ﬁnd a positive and zero eﬀect,
respectively, of an increase in inequality on economic growth.
These ﬁndings, however, ought to be interpreted very cautiously. They appear to have
no bearing on the validity of the theories and are not very informative about the overall eﬀect
of inequality. First, these studies examine the eﬀect of inequality beyond its eﬀects through
education, fertility, and investment. For instance, Barro (2000) has found that, once controls for
education, fertility, and investment are introduced, there is no relationship between inequality
a n de c o n o m i cg r o w t hi nt h ee n t i r es a m p l e .H i sﬁndings, therefore, suggest that inequality does
not have a direct eﬀe c to ng r o w t hb e y o n di t se ﬀects through education, fertility and investment
(i.e., the dominating channels through which inequality operates), implying perhaps that the
dominating channels through which inequality operates are those proposed in the literature. In
particular, if the control for fertility is dropped in Barro (2000), the eﬀect of inequality on growth
thus inequality would be expected to have contrasting eﬀects on these two variables (e.g., Galor and Zhang, 1997),
Perotti (1996) suggests that the human capital channel is reinforced by the introduction of fertility. Inequality is
associated with higher fertility rates and a lower level of investment in human capital, which are in turn associated
with lower economic growth.
38The adverse eﬀects of ﬁnancial constraints on economic development are well established (Levine, 2005).
32is signiﬁcantly negative, as predicted by the theory. Moreover, these studies examine the eﬀect
of inequality in the short run (i.e., the eﬀect of inequality on the average growth rate in the
subsequent 5—10 years), while as suggested by the theories, inequality is likely to have mostly
longer-run eﬀects (e.g., via the formation of human capital).
Moreover, even within the context of the limited scope of the studies of Forbes (2000) and
Barro (2000), their econometric methodology and their ﬁndings have been challenged. Banerjee
and Duﬂo (2003) argued that the linear regression structure imposed in these and earlier empirical
studies is inconsistent with the predictions of the theories and the qualitative ﬁndings may be
an artifact of the imposed linearity. They ﬁnd that changes in inequality (in any direction)
are associated with lower growth rates. Moreover, in line with the adverse long-run impact of
inequality proposed by the theories, they ﬁnd a negative relationship between growth rates and
lagged inequality.
Recently, Easterly (2007) has reaﬃrmed the hypothesis advanced by the modern theories
that inequality has an adverse eﬀect on human capital formation and economic development.
Using agricultural endowments as an instrument for inequality in order to overcome concerns
about measurement errors and the endogeneity of inequality, his cross-country analysis suggests
that inequality has been a barrier to schooling and economic prosperity.
5.2 Industrialization and Human Capital Formation
The process of industrialization was characterized by a gradual increase in the relative impor-
tance of human capital in the production process. As underlined by Uniﬁed Growth Theory
(Galor, 2011), this important development was triggered by acceleration in the rate of techno-
logical progress and the role of human capital in adapting to a rapidly changing technological
environment.
In the ﬁrst phase of the Industrial Revolution, human capital played a limited role in the
production process. Education was motivated by a variety of factors, including religion, enlight-
enment, social control, moral conformity, sociopolitical stability (i.e., the shadow of rebellion of
the masses), social and national cohesion, and military eﬃciency. The extent to which public
education was provided was not correlated with industrial development, and it diﬀered across
countries due to political, cultural, social, historical, and institutional factors. Human capital
had a limited role in the production process; education instead served religious, social, and na-
33tional goals. As argued by Landes (1969), although certain workers — supervisory and oﬃce
personnel in particular — were required to be able to read and do the elementary arithmetical
operations in order to perform their duties, a large fraction of the work of industry was performed
by illiterates, especially in the early days of the Industrial Revolution.
In contrast, during the second phase of the Industrial Revolution, the demand for skilled
labor in the growing industrial sector markedly increased. Human capital formation was designed
primarily to satisfy the increasing skill requirements in the process of industrialization, and
industrialists became involved in shaping the educational system. Moreover, the reversal of
the Malthusian relationship between income and population growth during the demographic
transition corresponded to a further increase in the level of resources invested in each child.
Evidence relating to the evolution of the return on human capital during this period is
scarce and controversial.39 One can mistakenly argue that the lack of clear evidence about the
increase in the return on human capital during this period indicates the absence of a signiﬁcant
increase in the demand for human capital. However, this partial equilibrium argument is ﬂawed.
The return on human capital is aﬀected by the demand and supply of human capital. Technologi-
cal progress in the second phase of the Industrial Revolution brought about an increase in demand
for human capital, and indeed, in the absence of a supply response, one would have expected an
increase in the return on human capital. However, the signiﬁcant increase in schooling that took
place during the nineteenth century (in particular, the introduction of public education), which
lowered the cost of education, generated a signiﬁcant increase in the supply of educated workers.
Some of this supply response was a direct reaction to the increase in demand for human capital
and thus may have only operated to partially oﬀset the increase in the return on human capi-
tal. However, the removal of the adverse eﬀect of credit constraints on the acquisition of human
capital (as reﬂected by the introduction of public education) generated an additional force that
increased the supply of educated labor and operated to reduce the return on human capital.
Reassuringly, Becker et al. (2011), in the ﬁrst rigorous attempt to examine empirically
the role of education in the process of industrialization, provide evidence about the important
role that education played in the process of industrialization. Using variation in pre-industrial
education across counties in Prussia in 1816 as instrument for later education levels in these
39Not surprisingly, existing evidence focusing on the return on old skills (e.g., construction) does not ﬁnd that
the return on such skills increased in England over the course of the nineteenth century (Clark, 2005).
34counties, they ﬁnd that education contributed signiﬁcantly to industrialization in two industrial
phases, in 1849 and 1882. Moreover, as implied by Uniﬁed Growth Theory, the ﬁnd that the role
of education have been intensiﬁed in the second phase of Prussia’s industrialization.40
5.2.1 Industrial Demand for Education
Education reforms in developed countries in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries are indicative
of the signiﬁcance of industrial development in the formation of human capital during the second
half of the nineteenth century. In particular, diﬀerences in the timing of the establishment of a
national system of public education between England and continental Europe are instrumental
in isolating the role that industrial forces played in human capital formation.
England During the ﬁrst phase of the Industrial Revolution (1760—1830), capital accumulation
increased signiﬁcantly without a corresponding increase in the supply of skilled labor. The
investment-output ratio increased from 6% in 1760 to 12% in 1831 (Crafts, 1985, p. 73), whereas
literacy rates remained largely unchanged, and the state devoted virtually no resources to raising
the level of literacy among the masses (Mokyr, 2001). Literacy was largely a cultural skill
or a hierarchical symbol and was of limited use in the production process. For instance, in
1841, only 5% of male workers and only 2% of female workers were employed in occupations
in which literacy was strictly required (Mitch, 1992). Furthermore, an illiterate labor force
could operate the existing technology, and economic growth was not impeded by educational
retardation.41 Workers developed skills primarily through on-the-job training, and child labor
was highly valuable.
The development of a national public system of education in England lagged behind other
Western European countries by nearly half a century (Sanderson, 1995).42 England’s early indus-
trialization occurred without direct state intervention in the development of the minimal skills
40The rise in the demand for education in the process of industrialization (prior to the demographic transition)
is underlined in the theories of Galor and Weil (2000) and Galor and Moav (2002). Moreover, the contribution of
education to industrialization is consistent with both theories, although Galor and Moav (2002) attributes a more
signiﬁcant role for education in the ﬁrst phase of industrialization.
41Some have argued that the low skill requirements even declined over this period. For instance, Sanderson
(1995) suggests that the emerging economy created a whole range of new occupations that required even less
literacy and education than the old ones.
42For instance, in his parliamentary speech in defense of his 1837 education bill, Whig politician Henry Brougham
reﬂected on this gap: “It cannot be doubted that some legislative eﬀort must at length be made to remove from
this country the opprobrium of having done less for education of the people than any of the more civilized nations
on earth” (Green, 1990, pp. 10—11).
35required for industrial production (Green, 1990). England initiated a sequence of reforms in
its educational system after the 1830s and literacy rates gradually increased. The process was
initially motivated by nonindustrial reasons, such as religion, social control, moral conformity, en-
lightenment, and military eﬃciency, as was the case in other European countries (e.g., Germany,
France, Holland, and Switzerland) that had supported public education much earlier. However,
in light of the modest demand for skills and literacy by the capitalists, the level of governmental
support was rather small.43
As the Industrial Revolution progressed to its second phase, the demand for skilled labor
in the growing industrial sector markedly increased, and the proportion of children aged 5—14
in primary schools rose from 11% in 1855 to 25% in 1870 (Flora et al., 1983). Literacy became
an increasingly desirable characteristic for employment, as indicated by job advertisements of
the period (Mitch, 1993). In light of industrial competition from other countries, capitalists
started to recognize the importance of technical education for the provision of skilled workers.
As noted by Sanderson (1995, pp. 10—13), “Reading ...enabled the eﬃcient functioning of an
urban industrial society laced with letter writing, drawing up wills, apprenticeship indentures,
passing bills of exchange, and notice and advertisement reading.” Moreover, manufacturers argued
that “universal education is required in order to select, from the mass of the workers, those who
r e s p o n dw e l lt os c h o o l i n ga n dw o u l dm a k eag o o df o r e m a no nt h es h o pﬂoor” (Simon, 1987,
p. 104).
As it became apparent that skills were necessary for the creation of an industrial society, re-
placing previous concerns that the acquisition of literacy would make the working classes receptive
to radical and subversive ideas, capitalists lobbied for the provision of public education.44 The
pure laissez-faire policy failed to develop a proper educational system, and capitalists demanded
government intervention in the provision of education. As Leeds iron-master and advocate of
technical education James Kitson explained to the Select Committee on Scientiﬁc Instruction
(1867—1868): “[T]he question is so extensive that individual manufacturers are not able to grap-
ple with it, and if they went to immense trouble to establish schools they would be doing it in
43Even in 1869, the English government funded only one-third of school expenditure (Green, 1990).
44There was a growing consensus among workers and capitalists about the virtues of reform. The labor union
movement was increasingly calling for a national system of nonsectarian education. The National Education League
(founded in 1869 by radical Liberals and Dissenters) demanded a free, compulsory, nonsectarian national system
of education (Green, 1990).
36order that others may reap the beneﬁt” (Green, 1990, p. 295).45 An additional turning point
in the attitude of English capitalists toward public education was the Paris Exhibition of 1867,
where the limitations of English scientiﬁc and technical education became evident. Unlike the
1851 exhibition in which England won most of the prizes, the English performance in Paris was
rather poor, and of the 90 classes of manufacturers, Britain dominated only in 10.46
In 1868, the government established the parliamentary Select Committee on ScientiﬁcE d -
ucation. This was the origin of nearly 20 years of various parliamentary investigations into the
relationship between the sciences, industry, and education designed to address the capitalists’
outcry over the necessity of universal public education. A sequence of reports by the Commit-
tee in 1868, by the Royal Commission on Scientiﬁc Instruction and the Advancement of Science
during 1872—1875, and by the Royal Commission on Technical Education in 1882 underlined
the inadequate training for supervisors, managers, proprietors and workers. They argued that
most managers and proprietors did not understand the manufacturing process and thus failed to
promote eﬃciency, investigate innovative techniques or value the skills of their workers (Green,
1990). In particular, W. E. Forster, the vice president of the committee of the Council of Ed-
ucation, told The House of Commons: “Upon the speedy provision of elementary education
depends our industrial prosperity . . . if we leave our work-folk any longer unskilled ...they will
become overmatched in the competition of the world” (Hurt, 1971, pp. 223—224). The reports
made various recommendations that highlighted the need to redeﬁne elementary schools, to revise
the curriculum throughout the entire school system (particularly with respect to industry and
manufacturing) and to improve teacher training.
In addition, in 1868 the Schools Inquiry Commission investigated the secondary schools. It
found that the level of instruction in the vast majority of schools was very unsatisfactory, reﬂecting
the employment of untrained teachers and the use of antiquated teaching methods. Its main
proposal was to organize a state inspection of secondary schools and provide eﬃcient education
geared to the speciﬁc needs of its consumers. In particular, the Royal Commission on Technical
Education of 1882 conﬁrmed that England was being overtaken by the industrial superiority
45Indeed, the Factory Act of 1802 required owners of textile mills to provide elementary instruction for their
apprentices, but the law was poorly enforced (Cameron, 1993).
46Lyon Playfair, who was one of the jurors, reported that “a singular accordance of opinion prevailed that our
country has shown little inventiveness and made little progress in the peaceful arts of industry since 1862.” The
cause of this lack of progress “upon which there was most unanimity conviction is that France, Prussia, Austria,
Belgium and Switzerland possess good systems of industrial education and that England possesses none” (Green,
1990, p. 296).
37of Prussia, France and the United States and recommended the introduction of technical and
scientiﬁc education to secondary schools.
It appears that the English government gradually yielded to the capitalists and increased
contributions to elementary as well as higher education. In the 1870 Education Act, the gov-
ernment assumed responsibility for ensuring universal elementary education. In 1880, prior to
the signiﬁcant extension of the franchise in 1884 — which made the working class the majority
in most industrial counties — education was made compulsory throughout England. The 1889
Technical Instruction Act allowed the new local councils to set up technical instruction commit-
tees, and the 1890 Local Taxation Act provided public funds that could be spent on technical
education (Green, 1990). Finally, the 1902 Balfour Education Act marked the establishment of
a national education system that provided free compulsory elementary education (Ringer, 1979;
Green, 1990).
School enrollment of 10-year-olds increased from 40% in 1870 to 100% in 1900. The lit-
eracy rate among men, which was stable at around 65% during the ﬁrst phase of the Industrial
Revolution, increased signiﬁcantly during the second phase reaching nearly 100% at the end of
the nineteenth century (Cipolla, 1969). Also, the proportion of children aged 5—14 in primary
schools increased signiﬁcantly in the second half of the nineteenth century, from 11% in 1855 to
74% in 1900 (Flora et al., 1983).
Continental Europe The early development of public education occurred in the western coun-
tries of continental Europe (e.g., Prussia, France, Sweden, and the Netherlands) well before the
Industrial Revolution and was motivated by social, religious, political, and national factors. How-
ever, as was the case in England, massive educational reforms occurred in the second half of the
nineteenth century due to the rising demand for skills in the process of industrialization. As
noted by Green (1990, pp. 293—294), “In continental Europe industrialization occurred under
the tutelage of the state and began its accelerated development later when techniques were al-
ready becoming more scientiﬁc; technical and scientiﬁc education had been vigorously promoted
from the center as an essential adjunct of economic growth and one that was recognized to be
indispensable for countries which wished to close Britain’s industrial lead.”
In France the initial development of the education system occurred well before the In-
dustrial Revolution, but the process was intensiﬁed and transformed to satisfy industrial needs
38during the second phase of industrialization. The early development of elementary and secondary
education in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was dominated by the church and religious
orders. Some state interventions in technical and vocational training were designed to reinforce
development in commerce, manufacturing, and military eﬃciency. After the French Revolution,
the state established universal primary schools, but enrollment rates remained rather low. The
state concentrated on the development of secondary and higher education, with the objective of
producing an eﬀective elite to operate the military and governmental apparatus. Secondary edu-
cation remained highly selective, oﬀering general and technical instruction largely to the middle
class (Green, 1990). Legislative proposals during the National Convention quoted by Cubberley
(1991) are revealing about the underlying motives behind education in this period: “[C]hildren
of all classes were to receive education, physical, moral and intellectual, best adapted to develop
in them republican manners, patriotism, and the love of labor . . . .They are to be taken into
the ﬁelds and workshops where they may see agricultural and mechanical operations going on.”
The process of industrialization in France, the associated increase in the demand for skilled
labor, and the breakdown of the traditional apprenticeship system signiﬁcantly aﬀected the state’s
attitude toward education. State grants for primary schools gradually increased in the 1830s,
and some legislation was introduced to provide primary education in all regions, extend higher
education, and provide teacher training and school inspections. The number of communities
without schools fell by 50% from 1837 to 1850 and, as the inﬂuence of industrialists on the
structure of education intensiﬁed, education became more stratiﬁed according to occupational
patterns (Anderson, 1975). This legislation reﬂected the increasing need for skilled labor in
the economic environment of the period (Green, 1990). The eagerness of capitalists for rapid
education reforms was reﬂected by the organization of industrial societies that ﬁnanced schools
specializing in chemistry, design, mechanical weaving, spinning, and commerce (Anderson, 1975).
As was the case in England, competition led industrialists to lobby for the provision of
public education. The Great Exhibition of 1851 and the London Exhibition of 1862 created the
impression that the technological gap between France and other European nations was narrowing
and that French manufacturers should invest in the education of their labor force to maintain
their technological superiority. Subsequently, reports on the state of industrial education by
commissions established in 1862—1865 reﬂected the pleas of industrialists for the provision of
industrial education on a large scale and for the implementation of scientiﬁck n o w l e d g ei nt h e
39industry. “The goal of modern education . . . can no longer be to form men of letters, idle
admirers of the past, but men of science, builders of the present, initiators of the future.”47
Education reforms in France were extensive in the second phase of the Industrial Revolution, and
by 1881 a universal, free, compulsory, and secular primary school system had been established,
and technical and scientiﬁc education was further emphasized. Illiteracy rates among conscripts
tested at the age of 20 declined gradually from 38% in 1851—1855 to 17% in 1876-1880 (Anderson,
1975), and the proportion of children aged 5—14 in primary schools increased from 52% in 1850
to 86% in 1901 (Flora et al., 1983).
In Prussia, as in France, where the initial steps toward compulsory education took place
at the beginning of the eighteenth century, well before the Industrial Revolution, education was
viewed primarily as a way to unify the state. In the second part of the eighteenth century,
education was made compulsory for all children aged 5—13. Nevertheless, these regulations were
not strictly enforced partly due to the lack of funding (reﬂecting the diﬃculty of taxing landlords
for this purpose) and partly due to their adverse eﬀect on child labor income. At the beginning
of the nineteenth century, motivated by the need for national cohesion, military eﬃciency, and
trained bureaucrats, the education system was further reformed. Provincial and district school
boards were established, education became compulsory (and secular) for a 3-year period, and the
gymnasium was reconstituted as a state institution that provided 9 years of education for the
elite (Cubberley, 1991; Green, 1990).
Similarly to England and France, industrialization in Prussia triggered the implementation
of universal elementary schooling. Taxes were imposed to ﬁnance the school system, and teach-
ers’ training and certiﬁcations were established. Secondary schools started to serve industrial
needs as well; the Realschulen — which emphasized the teaching of mathematics and science —
were gradually adopted, and vocational and trade schools were founded. Total enrollment in
secondary school increased sixfold from 1870 to 1911 (Flora et al., 1983). Furthermore, the In-
dustrial Revolution signiﬁcantly aﬀected the nature of education in German universities. German
industrialists, who perceived advanced technology as a competitive advantage, lobbied for reforms
in the operation of universities and oﬀered to pay to reshape their activities toward technological
training and industrial applications of basic research (McClelland, 1980).
The evolution of education in the Netherlands also reﬂected the interest of capitalists in
47L’enseignement Professionnel, ii (1864, p. 332), quoted in Anderson (1975, p. 194).
40the skill formation of the masses. In particular, as early as the 1830s, industrial schools were
established and funded by private organizations, representing industrialists and entrepreneurs.
Ultimately, in the latter part of the nineteenth century, the state — urged by industrialists and
entrepreneurs — started to support these schools (Wolthuis, 1999).
United States The process of industrialization in the United States also increased the impor-
tance of human capital in the production process. Evidence provided by Abramovitz and David
(2000) and Goldin and Katz (2001) suggests that during 1890—1999 the contribution of human
capital accumulation to the growth process of the United States nearly doubled.48 As argued by
Goldin (1998), the rise of the industrial, business and commerce sectors in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries increased the demand for managers, clerical workers, and educated sales
personnel who were trained in accounting, typing, shorthand, algebra, and commerce. Further-
more, in the late 1910s, technologically advanced industries demanded blue-collar craft workers
who were trained in geometry, algebra, chemistry, mechanical drawing and related skills. The
structure of education was transformed in response to industrial development and the increasing
importance of human capital in the production process, and American high schools adapted to
the needs of the modern workplace of the early twentieth century. Total enrollment in public
secondary schools increased seventy-fold from 1870 to 1950 (Kurian, 1994).49
5.2.2 Land Concentration: A Hurdle for Human Capital Formation
The transition from an agricultural to an industrial economy altered the nature of the conﬂict
among interest groups in society. The conﬂict of interest between the elite and the masses which
had characterized the agricultural stage of development was transformed into a conﬂict between
48Literacy rates in the United States were rather high prior to this increase in the demand for skilled labor.
Literacy rates among the white population were already 89% in 1870, 92% in 1890, and 95% in 1910 (Engerman
and Sokoloﬀ, 2000). Education in earlier periods was motivated by social control, moral conformity, and social and
national cohesion, as well as by skills required for trade and commerce. In particular, Bowles and Gintis (1975)
and Field (1976) argue that educational reforms are designed to sustain the existing social order by displacing
social problems into the school system.
49As noted by Galor and Moav (2006), due to diﬀerences in the structure of education ﬁnance in the United States
in comparison to European countries, capitalists in the United States had only limited incentives to lobby for the
provision of education and to support it ﬁnancially. Unlike the central role that government funding played in the
provision of public education in European countries, the evolution of the educational system in the United States
was based on local initiatives and funding. The local nature of education initiatives induced community members,
in urban as well as rural areas, to play a signiﬁcant role in advancing their schooling systems. American capitalists,
however, faced limited incentives to support the provision of education within a county in an environment where
labor was mobile across counties and the beneﬁts from educational expenditure in one county could be reaped by
employers in other counties.
41the entrenched landed elites and emerging capitalist elites. As documented in section 5.2.1, the
capitalists who were striving for an educated labor force supported policies that promoted public
education. In contrast, as documented in this section, landowners, whose interest lay in the
reduction of the mobility of the rural labor force, favored policies that deprived the masses of
education (Galor et al., 2009).50
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the degree of concentration of land ownership across
countries and regions is inversely related to education expenditure and attainment. North and
South America provide the most distinctive set of suggestive evidence regarding the relationship
among the distribution of land ownership, education reforms, and the process of development.
The original colonies in North and South America had vast amounts of land per person and
levels of income per capita that were comparable to those of Western Europe. North and Latin
America, however, diﬀered in the distribution of land and resources. While the United States
and Canada have been characterized by a relatively egalitarian distribution of land ownership, in
the rest of the New World, land and resources have been persistently concentrated in the hands
of the elite (Deininger and Squire, 1998).
Persistent diﬀerences in the distribution of land ownership between North and Latin Amer-
ica were associated with a signiﬁcant divergence in education and income levels across these
regions (Maddison, 2001). Although all economies in the Western hemisphere were developed
enough in the early nineteenth century to justify investment in primary schools, only the United
States and Canada were engaged in the education of the general population (Coatsworth, 1993;
Engerman and Sokoloﬀ, 2000).51
Variations in the degree of inequality in the distribution of land ownership among Latin
American countries were reﬂected in diﬀerences in investment in human capital as well. In par-
ticular, Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay, in which inequality in the distribution of land ownership
was less pronounced, invested signiﬁcantly more in education (Engerman and Sokoloﬀ, 2000).
Similarly, Nugent and Robinson (2002) show that in Costa Rica and Colombia, where coﬀee is
typically grown on small farms (reﬂecting lower inequality in the distribution of land), income
50Interestingly, during the 19th century, the emergence of a broad-based demand for human capital-intensive
services by the landowners in land-rich economies in Latin America (e.g., Argentina) triggered the establishment of
an extensive public education system prior to the onset of signiﬁcant manufacturing activities (Galiani et al., 2008).
51O n em a yv i e wt h ec o n ﬂict that led to the Civil War in the United States as a struggle between the industrialists
in the North, who were striving for a large supply of (educated) workers, and the landowners in the South, who
wanted to sustain the existing system and to ensure a large supply of cheap (uneducated) labor.
42and human capital are signiﬁcantly higher than in Guatemala and El Salvador, where coﬀee
plantations are rather large.52 Moreover, one of the principles championed by the progressives
during the Mexican Revolution of 1910 was compulsory free public education. However, the
achievement of this goal varied greatly by state. In the north, where land distribution was more
equitable, enrollment in public schools increased rapidly as industrialization advanced following
the revolution. In contrast, the south, which was dominated by haciendas, employing essen-
tially slave labor, there was virtually no increase in school enrollment following the revolution
(Vaughan, 1982). Similarly, rural education in Brazil lagged behind some other Latin American
countries due to the immense political power of the local landlords. Hence, in 1950, 30 years
after the Brazilian government had instituted an educational reform, nearly 75% of the nation
was still illiterate (Bonilla, 1965).
Moreover, the adverse eﬀect of the concentration of land ownership on education expendi-
ture has been established empirically. Galor et al. (2009) exploit exogenous source of variation
in the concentration of land ownership across states in the US using data from the beginning of
the twentieth century, they ﬁnd that inequality in the distribution of land ownership indeed had
an adverse eﬀect on public investment in education. Becker et al. (2010, 2012) exploit variation
in the concentration of land ownership across counties in Prussia and show that landownership
was negatively related to educational enrolment in Prussia in 1816 and in 1849.
5.2.3 Land Reforms and Education Reforms
Evidence from Japan, Korea, Russia, and Taiwan indicates that land reforms were followed by,
or occurred simultaneously with, signiﬁcant education reforms. There are two interpretations for
these historical episodes. First, land reforms could have diminished the economic incentives of
landowners to block education reforms. Second, an unfavorable shift in the balance of power from
the viewpoint of the landed aristocracy could have brought about the implementation of both
land and education reforms, consistent with the basic premise that landowners opposed spending
on education, whereas others (e.g., the industrial elite) favored it.
52In contrast to the proposed theory, Nugent and Robinson (2002) suggest that a holdup problem generated
by the monopsonistic power in large plantations prevents commitment to reward investment in human capital,
whereas smallholders can capture the reward to human capital and therefore have the incentive to invest. This
mechanism does not generate the economic forces that permit the economy to escape this institutional trap.
43Japan and the Meiji Restoration Toward the end of the Tokugawa regime (1600—1867),
although the level of education in Japan was impressive for its time, the provision of education
was sporadic and had no central control or funding, reﬂecting partly the resistance of the land-
holding military class to education reforms (Gubbins, 1973). The opportunity to modernize the
educational system arrived following the overthrow of the traditional feudal structure shortly
after the Meiji Restoration of 1868. In 1871, an imperial decree initiated the abolishment of the
feudal system. In a sequence of legislation during 1871—1883, decisions regarding land utilization
and the choice of crops were transferred from landlords to farmers, prohibitions on the sale and
mortgage of farmland were removed, a title of ownership was granted to the legal owners of the
land, and communal pasture and forest land were transferred from the ownership of wealthy land-
lords to the ownership of the central government. This legislation resulted in the distribution of
land among small family farms, a structure that persisted until the rise of a new landlord system
during the 1930s (Hayami, 1975, chapter 3).
Education reform and land reform evolved simultaneously. In 1872 the Educational Code
established compulsory and locally funded education for all children between the ages 6 and 14
(Gubbins, 1973). In addition, the central government funded a secondary school and university
system. The Education Code of 1872 was reﬁned in 1879 and 1886, setting the foundations for
the structure of Japanese education until World War II. The progress in education attainment
following the land reforms of the Meiji government was substantial: while in 1873 only 28% of
school-age children attended schools, this ratio increased to 51% by 1883 and to 94% by 1903
(Passin, 1965).
Russia before the Revolution Education in tsarist Russia lagged well behind comparable
European countries at the close of the nineteenth century. Provincial councils dominated by
wealthier landowners were responsible for their local school systems and were reluctant to favor
the education of the peasants (Johnson, 1969). Literacy rates in rural areas were 21% in 1896,
and the urban literacy rate was 56%. As the tsar’s grip on power weakened during the early
1900s, the political power of the wealthy landowners gradually declined, leading to a sequence
of agrarian reforms that were initiated by the Premier Pyotr Stolypin in 1906. Restrictions on
the mobility of peasants were abolished, fragmented landholdings were consolidated, and the
formation of individually owned farms was encouraged and supported through the provision of
44government credit. Stolypin’s reforms accelerated the redistribution of land to individual farmers,
and landholdings of the landed aristocracy declined from about 35—45% in 1860 to 17% in 1917
(Johnson, 1969).
Following the agrarian reforms and the declining inﬂuence of the landed aristocracy, the
provision of compulsory elementary education was proposed. The initial eﬀort of 1906 languished,
but the newly created representative body, the Duma, continued to pressure the government to
provide free compulsory education. During the period 1908—1912, the Duma approved a sequence
of signiﬁcant increases in expenditures for education (Johnson, 1969). The share of the provincial
council’s budget that was allocated to education increased from 20% in 1905 to 31% in 1914
(Johnson, 1969), the share of the central government’s budget devoted to the Ministry of Public
Education increased threefold from 1.4% in 1906 to 4.9% in 1915, and the share of the entire
population that was actively attending schools increased threefold from 1.7% in 1897 to 5.7% in
1915 (Dennis, 1961).
South Korea and Taiwan The process of development in Korea was marked by major land
reform followed by a massive increase in governmental expenditure on education. During the
Japanese occupation in 1905—1945, land distribution in Korea became increasingly skewed, and
by 1945 nearly 70% of Korean farming households were simply tenants (Eckert, 1990). During the
period 1948—1950, the Republic of Korea instituted the Agricultural Land Reform Amendment
A c tt h a td r a s t i c a l l ya ﬀected landholdings.53 The principle of land reform was enshrined in the
constitution of 1948 and the actual implementation of the Agricultural Land Reform Amendment
Act began on March 1950.54 This act prohibited tenancy and land renting, put a maximum on
the amount of land any individual could own, and dictated that individuals could only own land
if they actually cultivated it. Owner cultivated farm households increased sixfold from 349,000
in 1949 to 1,812,000 in 1950, and tenant farm households declined from 1,133,000 in 1949 to
essentially 0 in 1950 (Yoong-Deok and Kim, 2000).
Land reforms were accompanied by soaring expenditures on education. In 1949, a new
Education Law was passed in South Korea that focused speciﬁcally on transforming the popu-
53A major force behind this land reform was the aim of the post-World War II U.S. provisional government to
remove the inﬂuence of the large landowners (who were either Japanese or collaborators with the Japanese).
54Formally, education reform took place prior to the land reforms, but the provision for land reform was enshrined
in the constitution prior to educational reform. The imminent land reform could have reduced the incentives for
the landed aristocracy to oppose this education reform.
45lation into a technically competent workforce capable of industrial work. This legislation led to
dramatic increases in the number of schools and students at all levels of education. Between 1945
and 1960, the number of elementary schools increased by 60%, and the number of elementary
students went up by a staggering 165%. In secondary education, the growth was even more dra-
matic, with both the number of schools and the number of students growing by a factor of ten.
The number of higher education institutions quadrupled, and that of higher education students
increased from only 7,000 in 1945 to more than 100,000 in 1960. In 1948, Korea allocated 8%
of government expenditures to education. Following a slight decline due to the Korean War,
educational expenditure increased to 9% in 1957 and to 15% in 1960, remaining at that level
thereafter (Sah-Myung, 1983).
Taiwan experienced similar reforms during the same period, once Japanese colonization
ended. The government of Taiwan implemented reforms during 1949—1953, enforcing rent reduc-
tions, selling public land to individual farmers who had previously been tenants, and permitting
the purchase of rented land. In 1948, prior to these reforms, 57% of farm families were full or
part owners, and 43% were tenants or hired hands; by 1959, the share of full or part owners had
increased to 81%, and the share of tenants had dropped to 19% (Chen, 1961).
A massive education reform accompanied these land reforms. The number of schools in
Taiwan grew by 5% per year between 1950 and 1970, while the number of students grew by
6% per year. The pattern of growth mirrors that of South Korea, with an especially impressive
growth of 11% per year in the number of secondary students and 16% per year in higher education
students. Funding for education grew from 1.8% of GNP in 1951 to 4.1% in 1970 (Lin, 1983).
In 1950 South Korea and Taiwan were primarily agricultural economies with a GDP per
capita (measured in 1990 international dollars) of about $770 and $940, respectively. South
Korea and Taiwan’s GDP per capita lagged well behind many countries in Latin America, such
as Colombia ($2150) and Mexico ($2360), despite sharing with these countries a legacy of vast
inequality in the distribution of agricultural land. In contrast to the Latin American countries,
the implementation of land reforms in South Kore aa n dT a i w a na n di t sa s s o c i a t i o nw i t he d u c a t i o n
reforms contributed to their tremendous growth performance in the post-war period. With a level
of income per capita in 1950 that placed them not only far behind the nations of Latin America
but also behind Congo, Liberia, and Mozambique, these two countries have each grown at an
average rate of nearly 6% per year between 1950 and 1998, leaving behind the countries of sub-
46Saharan Africa and overtaking the Latin American countries. In 1998, South Korea and Taiwan
had GDP per capita levels that were 150% higher than that of Colombia and 100% higher than
in Mexico (Maddison, 2001).
5.2.4 Political and Education Reforms
The nineteenth century was marked by signiﬁcant political reforms along with the previously
described education reforms and impressive human capital formation. One could therefore chal-
lenge the signiﬁcance of the industrial motive for educational reform, suggesting that political
reforms during the nineteenth century shifted the balance of power toward the working class and
enabled workers to implement education reforms independently of the interests of the industrial
elite. Have political institutions, rather than changes in economic incentives in the process of
development, been the prime force behind the formation of human capital during this period?
Political reforms that took place in the nineteenth century had no apparent eﬀect on ed-
ucation reforms during this period, strengthening the hypothesis that industrial development,
and the increasing demand for human capital, were indeed the trigger for human capital forma-
tion and the subsequent onset of the demographic transition. Education reforms took place in
autocratic states that did not relinquish political power throughout the nineteenth century, and
major reforms occurred in societies in the midst of the process of democratization well before the
stage at which the working class constituted the majority of voters.
In particular, as depicted in Figure 7, the most signiﬁcant education reforms in England
were completed before the voting majority shifted to the working class. The Reform Act of 1832
nearly doubled the total electorate, but only 13% of the voting-aged population was enfranchised.
Artisans, the working classes, and some sections of the lower middle classes remained outside the
political system. The franchise was extended further by the Reform Acts of 1867 and 1884, and
the total electorate nearly doubled in each of these episodes. However, working-class voters did
not become the majority in all urban counties until 1884 (Craig, 1989).
Figure 7 shows that a trend of signiﬁcant increases in primary education was established
well before the extension of the voting rights in the context of the 1867 and 1884 Reform Acts.
In particular, the proportion of children aged 5—14 in primary schools increased ﬁvefold (and
surpassed 50%) over the three decades prior to the extension of the franchise in 1884 in which the
working class was granted a majority in all urban counties. Furthermore, the political reforms
47do not appear to have had an eﬀect on the pattern of educational reform. In fact, the average
growth rate of school attendance from decade to decade during 1855—1920 reached a peak around
the Reform Act of 1884 and started declining thereafter. It is interesting to note, however, that
the abolition of education fees in nearly all elementary schools occurred only in 1891, after the
Reform Act of 1884, suggesting that the political power of the working class may have aﬀected
the distribution of education cost across the population, but the decision to educate the masses
appears to be taken independently of the political power of the working class.
Thus, the onset of England’s education reforms, and in particular, the fundamental Edu-
cation Act of 1870 and its major extension in 1880, occurred prior to the political reforms of 1884
that made the working class the majority in most counties. Moreover, while the shadow of the
rebellion of the masses that may have prompted political reforms may have also contributed to
education reforms (as established in Section 2.3.1), industrial demand for human capital in the
second phase of industrialization dominated sociopolitical concerns in human capital formation.
Figure 7. Evolution of voting rights and school enrollment.
Data source: Flora et al. (1983).
In France the trend of expanding education also preceded the major political reforms that
gave the voting majority to the working class (Figure 7). Prior to 1848, restrictions limited
the electorate to less than 2.5% of the voting-aged population. The 1848 revolution led to the
introduction of universal voting rights for nearlya l la d u l tm a l e sa n dr e s u l t e di nam a j o r i t yf o r
working class voters. Nevertheless, the proportion of children aged 5—14 in primary schools
doubled (and exceeded 50%) during the two decades prior to the extension of the franchise in
481848. Furthermore, the political reforms of 1848 did not appear to have an eﬀect on the pattern
of education expansion.
A similar pattern occurred in other European countries. Political reforms in the Nether-
lands did not aﬀect the trend in education expansion, and the proportion of children aged 5—14 in
primary schools exceeded 60% well before the major political reforms of 1887 and 1897. Similarly,
the trends of political and education reforms in Sweden, Italy, Norway, Prussia, and Russia do
not lend credence to the alternative hypothesis.55
6C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
Conventional wisdom about the relationship between income distribution and economic devel-
opment has been subjected to dramatic transformations in the past century. While Classical
economists advanced the hypothesis that inequality is beneﬁcial for economic development, the
Neoclassical paradigm, which had subsequently dominated the ﬁeld of macroeconomics, dismissed
the Classical hypothesis and promoted the viewpoint that the study of income distribution has
no signiﬁcance for the understanding of macroeconomic activity and the growth process.
A metamorphosis in these perspectives has taken place in the past two decades. Theory
and subsequent empirical evidence have demonstrated that income distribution does, in fact,
have a signiﬁcant impact on the growth process. Moreover, unlike the Classical viewpoint, which
underlined the beneﬁcial eﬀects of inequality for the growth process, the modern perspective has
highlighted the potential adverse eﬀects of inequality on the process of development.
The replacement of physical capital accumulation by human capital accumulation as the
prime engine of economic growth has changed the qualitative impact of inequality on the process
of development. In early stages of industrialization, as physical capital accumulation was a
prime source of economic growth, inequality enhanced the process of development by channeling
resources towards individuals whose marginal propensity to save is higher. In later stages of
development, however, as human capital has become the prime engine of economic growth, a more
equal distribution of income, in the presence of credit constraints, has stimulated investment in
human capital and promoted economic growth.
While the process of industrialization raised the importance of human capital in the produc-
55Relatedly, Galor et al. (2009) ﬁnd a positve eﬀect of of education on political reforms acrsss coutnries in the
period 1960-2000.
49tion process, reﬂecting its complementarity with physical capital and technology, human capital
accumulation has not beneﬁted all sectors of the economy. Inequality in the ownership of factors
of production has generated an incentive for some better-endowed agents to block the implemen-
tation of institutional changes and policies that promote human capital formation, resulting in a
suboptimal level of investment in human capital from a growth perspective.
The transition from an agricultural to an industrial economy changed the nature of the
main economic conﬂict in society. Unlike the agrarian economy, which was characterized by a
conﬂict of interests between the landed aristocracy and the masses, the process of industrialization
has brought about an additional conﬂict between the entrenched landed elite and the emerging
capitalist elite. In light of a lower degree of complementarity between human capital and the
agricultural sector, education has increased the productivity of labor in industrial production
more than in agricultural and primary good production, inducing rural-to-urban migration and
thus a decline in the rental rate. Thus, while industrialists have had a direct economic incentive to
support education policies that would foster human capital formation, landowners, whose interests
lay in the reduction of the mobility of their labor force, have favored policies that deprived
the masses of education, as long as their stake in the productivity of the industrial sector was
insuﬃcient. The adverse eﬀect of the implementation of public education on landowners’ income
from agricultural production has been magniﬁed by the concentration of land ownership. Thus,
as long as landowners aﬀected the political process and thereby the implementation of growth-
enhancing education policies, inequality in the distribution of land ownership has been a hurdle
for human capital accumulation, slowing the process of industrialization and the transition to
modern growth.
Economies in which land and other natural resources have been more equally distributed
have implemented earlier public education campaigns and have beneﬁted from the emergence of a
skill-intensive industrial sector and a rapid process of development. In contrast, among economies
marked by a more unequal distribution of ownership over land and other natural resources,
resource abundance that was a source of richness in the early stages of development has led in
later stages to under-investment in human capital, an unskilled labor-intensive industrial sector,
and a slower growth process. Thus, variation in the distribution of ownership over land and other
natural resources across countries has contributed to disparity in human capital formation and
the industrial composition of the economy, and thus to divergent development patterns across the
50globe. Moreover, geographical conditions that led to income inequality brought about oppressive
institutions designed to maintain the political power of the elite and to preserve the existing
inequality .
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